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Possible Effects of
Nuclear Radiation Accidents
on Agriculture
M. C. Bell! and B. P. Riechere
Introduction
The purposes of this report are (1) to assess the impact
of nuclear radiation accidents on agriculture using power reac-
tor accidents as the primary concern; (2) to place nuclear radi-
ation risks into proper perspective with other risks; and (3)
to propose plans of action for the agricultural industry if Pro-
tective Action Guides are exceeded.
Consequences of nuclear war on agriculture are not con-
sidered in this report since they are so different, severe, and
devastating in comparison with peaceful uses of this valua-
ble energy resource. This report will focus on: (1) history of
nuclear radiation accidents, including reactors, nuclear
weapons tests, and nuclear accidents; (2) possible radioac-
tive contamination; (3) possible food chain contamination;
(4) recommended action for reducing food contamination; (5)
radiation induced cancers; and (6) risks from exposure to
ionizing radiation. A glossary of terms is provided at the end
of the publication.
Not only is nuclear fission a source for heat to produce
steam to turn turbines to produce electricity, but the fission
products are useful for many purposes. The fission products
are used in medicine, food and grain preservation, and to pro-
vide power for remote installations on earth and in outer
space.
Production of food and fiber in the United States now de-
pends upon advanced technology and involves less than four
percent of the population. Many people are also involved in
agricultural-related industries, such as food processing, trans-
portation, and marketing. Over 75 percent of the population
lEmeritus Professor of Animal Science, and for 17 years, was one of the
research leaders on fission products in food chains and radiation effects on
livestock at University of Tennessee - Atomic Energy Commission - Agricul-
tural Research Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He is presently chair-
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nessee Agricultural Experiment Station, was formerly the science writer and
news editor in the Department of Agricultural Communications, Univer-
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in many of the developing countries are involved in food and
fiber production. Most developing countries do not produce
sufficient food for their own use, while the United States ex-
ports a surplus of more than half of its food grains to pay
for expensive imports such as oil. Some of this country's sur-
plus is also used as gifts to feed starving people throughout
the world. Continued viable agriculture will require a con-
tinuous supply of energy from available sources.
Of primary importance is continued production, relatively
free of risk, of food for humans. Degree of risk should be
considered in relation to the other risks in life. Both food and
energy are needed wherever people are located. In fact, over
75 percent of the United States' total milk cows are located
in states with one or more operating nuclear power reactors
(Bell and Bell 1981 and Halsey 1980c). This report will fo-
cus on contamination of milk because milk is the primary
route of radionuclide contamination in the food chain to hu-
mans. Radionuclide contamination of the agricultural food
chain may come from accidents that may involve reactor fuels,
fuel reprocessing and storage plants, and transportation of
radioactive materials. Improper use of radiation facilities and
sources that are designed for both medical and industrial uses
have been responsible for accidental radiation exposures.
Per cent consumption of all dairy products in the United
States was 594 pounds milk equivalent in 1986 (Miller and
Short 1987). Most dairy farms meeting this demand are lo-
cated near the greatest population centers.
Nuclear power reactors are currently providing about 16%
of the electrical energy demand in the U. S. Much inconsis-
tent, misleading, and sensationalized information has been
published about the risks of nuclear power reactors. Simon
(1980) suggested that inaccurate statements may be made and
circulated for a number of reasons. These include selling of
books, newspapers, magazines, obtaining of funds for
research efforts, and striving for an unrealistic, idealistic, and
utopian state of affairs. Many journalists are not well informed
or educated on the processes involved in nuclear power gener-
ation (Garvey 1987). Nuclear power is not an energy alter-
native to be discarded because of emotional hysteria. It should
be considered along with other options based on risks and
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costs. The consequences of not having nuclear power reac-
tors are cited rarely in the popular media. Conservative esti-
mates put energy cost increases at 50%.
History of Nuclear Radiation Accidents
Reactors
Windscale Atomic Pile No.1 - October 10, 1957. The earli-
est notable nuclear radiation accident occurred when inade-
quate instrumentation for maintenance operations and poor
judgment on the part of the operating staff combined to cause
an overheating accident at the No. 1 atomic pile of a
plutonium-producing facility at Windscale, England, (Bishop
1959; Bell and Bell 1981).
According to the readings on dosimeter badges for the
13-week period that included the accident, only 14 workers
directly associated with the accident were exposed to more
than the maximum permissible levels of radiation. The In-
ternational Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) per-
missible level for 13 weeks was then 3.0 R. The highest figure
measured from the workers' badges was 4.66 R (Bell and Bell
1981).
Public concern mounted, and precautions were taken to
ensure uncontaminated food supplies. Milk supplies in the
area were condemned for human consumption if samples
showed 0.1 !lCi/liter of radioiodine (Chamberlain and Dun-
ster 1958; Bell and Bell 1981). Milk distribution was under
restriction for two to five weeks in the coastal area near the
accident, an area about 30 miles long, 10 miles wide at one
end and six at the other end (Bell and Bell 1981; Ward 1961).
Other foods and sources in the area were checked for possi-
ble contamination and found to be not harmful; thus no res-
trictions were placed on any of these (Bell and Bell 1981;
Chamberlain and Dunster 1958).
In the official report to the British Parliament, officials
stated, "We can justifiably say that it is in the highest degree
unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of any-
body in the course of this accident," (Bell and Bell 1981).
Vinca, Yugoslavia - October 15, 1958. An accident at Vinca,
a suburb of Belgrade, occured at a "zeropower" reactor built
for experimental purposes (Savic 1959). This accident in-
volved a brief uncontrolled run at the assembly which went
undetected because of the lack of an interlock system and
the fact that the safety circuits and monitors were turned off.
At the time of supercriticality, eight persons in the im-
mediate area around the reactor vessel were exposed to very
large doses of neutrons and ionizing radiation. Total body
radiation exposures measured 300 - 1500 R. An exposure of
400 to 500 R is considered lethal in 50 percent of the people
exposed. The doses received by the Yugoslavian workers were
very high, averaging 683 rems. One person died, and the
seven others were treated and apparently suffered no com-
plications. According to reports, no radioactive material es-
caped the facility, so there was no impact on the food chain
(Bell and Bell 1981).
Three Mile Island, Goldsboro, PA - March 28, 1979. The
highly publicized accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) num-
ber two reactor resulted from a series of equipment malfunc-
tions complicated by human misjudgments. The story ofTMI
has been told and retold, but the actual series of events cul-
minating in the worst nuclear accident this country has seen
may never be fully understood due to the many different in-
terpretations of the accident.
Three Mile Island reactor,completed in December 1978,
was a pressurized water reactor that could produce 880
megawatts of power. The accident apparently started when
a turbine trip caused a pressure-relief valve to vent nonradi-
oactive steam into the outside atmosphere on the morning
of March 28, 1979. The events following were termed a gen-
eral emergency, but made up a general state of confusion as
well. Part of the confusion resulted from the lack of a uni-
fied authority for such an emergency. On the scene were
representatives of various government agencies, state regu-
lators, and assorted media personnel. Reports were handed
down from Pennsylvania governor's office, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's crisis response center, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Resources, Metropoli-
tan Edison (who operated the plant), Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (a division of NRC), Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency, and various other groups. This gave
citizens in the surrounding areas virtually no real center of
authority for obtaining recommendations during the crisis
time.
Equipment failures and operator errors resulted in coolant
levels in the pressure vessel falling below the top of the core,
causing serious overheating. Claims abounded that the core
would melt down, expelling radioactive materials onto the
surrounding area. Further reports concluded that even if the
core had melted down, it "would probably solidify before
it melted through the TMI concrete foundation, and even
if it didn't, the bedrock underneath would be an effective
block" (Burnett 1980). Ifa meltdown occurred, the fission-
able material would be more dispersed, reducing the fission
rate, and in turn, reducing the temperature.
As it happened, the core was severely damaged but did
not melt down. Radioactive xenon-133 and krypton-85, noble
gases that are not retained in the human body, were released
from TMI. About 15 Ci of radioactive iodine were released
into the atmosphere. "The health effects of this iodine were
insignificant" (Burnett 1980). Samples taken at 375 kilome-
ters of the air mass containing gas released from the TMI
plant showed that the "whole-body dose to an indivi-
dual ... was 0.004 mrem." This amount is small indeed in
comparison to background radiation from natural sources,
which is annually over 100 mrem or about 25,000 times the
level from TMI (Wahlen et al. 1980) .
More than 100 dairy farms were located within 50 miles
of the TMI plant. A total of 8,490 dairy cattle, 1,880 beef
cattle, 475 swine, 100 sheep, 70 horses and 18 goats were
reported on 100 farms surveyed by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Agriculture in May following the accident (Halsey
1980b). About 630,000 people lived within a 20-mile radius
of the plant.
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Testing of milk for iodine-13l was started the day of the
accident, and tests were conducted on 50 dairy farms within
35 miles of the plant. Sampling was done by the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Agriculture's Division of Milk Sanitation.
Two gallons of milk were taken from each dairy for testing
by the Bureau of Radiation Protection and by the Food and
Drug Administration. Milk was also checked at 26 dairy
processors (Halsey 1980a).
Early milk tests showed insignificant amounts of radioiso-
topes. Final testing of the fresh milk revealed a range from
0.67 to 1.52 Bq/l (Halsey 1980a). This amount was signifi-
cantly below the 444 Bq/l at which milk is considered un-
safe to drink and the 14.8 Bq/l in Pennsylvania as a result
of the 1976 China tests (Krieg 1979).
Precautionary measures were taken to prevent contami-
nation. Farmers were advised to put their animals in barns
and give stored feed, although most cows were still in barns
from winter (Krieg 1979). The stored feed would not have
been contaminated by effluents from TMI. [Testing of
vegetables and soil samples revealed no traces of radioisotopes
by TMI (Krieg)].
The editor of Dairy Herd Management magazine surveyed
its readers in the seven-county area surrounding TMI, and
found that only one percent of the respondents reported hav-
ing moved their cows to another location during the height
of the crisis. Ninety-three percent of the respondents said
they had not considered moving their cows. Only one per-
cent of the dairy producers reported dumping any milk be-
cause of the accident (Halsey 1980b). Although the milk was
considered safe to drink, some consumers in neighboring
states were wary of milk products from the TMI area. Grocery
stores put up signs advertising their milk came from other
areas, and sales of bottled water to concerned consumers in-
creased. The news media carried many comments exaggera-
ting the recent events. Of farmers surveyed in the area, 69
percent said they believed that the media overplayed the in-
cident, and 68 precent said that they thought their milk sales
were hurt by the TMI plant shutdown (Halsey 1980b).
Bill Fouse, head of the Pennsylvania Division of Milk Sani-
tation, who was in charge of inspection and quality assur-
ance during the accident, summed up the attitude of many
farmers toward the TMI accident and the energy situation
as a whole with this statement: "I think the farmer will proba-
bly think more rationally than any other segment of society"
(Halsey 1980a).
The special Kemeny Commission concluded that, in spite
of the serious damage to the TMI plant, the actual release
of radioactivity would have a negligible effect on individuals.
Mental stress was the main effect.
Chernobyl - April 26, 1986. The worst nuclear power re-
actor accident observed in the world to date started in the
early morning hours on Saturday, April 26, 1986, at the Cher-
nobyl plant near Kiev, USSR (Figure 1). Unit four at the
power station was involved in an experiment, during which
a sudden surge of power was followed by two explosions in
rapid succession. This steam explosion was caused by a se-
quence of operator errors, including the unauthorized dis-
connection of several safety systems. The force of the
explosion blew the metal top off the reactor, dislodged the
huge crane above the reactor, and probably ruptured all of
the 1659 cooling water tubes (Abagyan et al. 1986). The blasts
of the steam explosions were so severe that they created a
chimney effect and propelled fission products high into the
atmosphere. The 6-foot-thick side walls held, and increased
the" chimney effect. " A fire broke out, melting some of the
asphalt floors and roofs. Four hours later, two workers had
died and several workers suffered thermal burns, excess radia-
tion exposures, and other injuries. One body was not reco-
vered. The accident was thought to be under control.
With the loss of water coolant to the fuel rods and possi-
ble other damage, radioactivity continued to be released into
the atmosphere. Then the graphite, which was used as a
moderator in that type of reactor, caught on fire, and the radi-
oactive releases into the atmosphere increased in a later ex-
plosion (Figure 2). The early release appeared to be mostly
radioactive volatiles such as iodine, cesium and the inert no-
ble gasses. Later, fragments of nonvolatile particles were
released into the atmosphere, including radioisotopes of stron-
tium, barium, uranium, and plutonium. It is estimated that
about half of the radioactivity in the reactor was released into
the atmosphere. This amounted to about 6 million times as
much radioactivity as was released from TMI in 1979 (Nor-
man 1986 and Norman and Dickson 1986). Maddox (1986)
estimates about 100 MCi of radioactivity was released, with
half of it in the gaseous form. USSR estimates are given in
Table 1.
The first public announcement regarding the accident from
the USSR came only after Sweden officals detected the radi-
oactive contamination coming from the USSR. This was fol-
lowed by media and government speculation, rumors and
sensationalism throughout the world. Speculations about large
losses of life may have been fueled by the amount of radio-
activity found in Scandanavia, which seemed to indicate a
massive reactor accident. The chimney effect that pushed the
released radioactivity high into the atmosphere was not con-
sidered in probable scenarios. USSR officials offered little
information about the accident, but instead criticized the so-
called exaggerations from the western governments and me-
dia. Soviet Leader Gorbachev even suggested establishment
of an international panel to set up guidelines to ensure notifi-
cation of neighboring nations in the event of a nuclear acci-
dent. This was not a new suggestion. The IAEA panel of
1967, with representatives of 15 nations, including Mr. Kos-
lov of USSR, published a 1969 Safety Series No. 32 pamph-
let on "Planning for the Handling of Radiation Accidents. "
The pamphlet did exactly what Mr. Gorbachev requested,
but USSR officials ignored the guidelines (Henningsen et al.
1969). The Chernobyl accident spread radioactivity over a
larger area but caused less loss oflife than the 1957-58 USSR
fuel reprocessing accident (Trabalka et al. 1980).
Evacuation of 90,000 people around Chernobyl was initi-
ated 36 hours following the accident. During the next 10 days,
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FIGURE 1
LOCATION OF CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER
ST ATION IN USSR
(Abagyan 1986)
o Moscow
CChernobyl
oKiev
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Table 1
Daily Radioactive Releases into
the Atmosphere from the Accident Unit
(Without Radioactive Noble Gases)*
(Abagyan 1986)
Time After the
Date Accident, Days Q Mel--
26.04 0 12
27.04 1 4.0
28.04 2 3.4
29.04 3 2.6
30.04 4 2.0
I 01.05 5 2.0
I 02.05 6 4.003.05 7 5.0
04.05 8 7.0
05.05 9 8.0
06.05 10 0.1
09.05 14 0.01
23.05 28 0.002
·Estimated error -50x
• ·values are recalculated for May 6, 1986
taking into account the radioactive decay
a total of 135,000 were evacuated. This orderly evacuation
may have been delayed until release activity rate had been
reduced to a safer level. Loss of life was relatively small for
the scope of this accident. Two workers died from mechani-
cal and radiation injury in the first few days. Radiation sick-
ness combined with thermal burns resulted in additional
deaths over the next several weeks. Thermal burns and in-
jury reduced the chance of survival from near lethal radia-
tion injury. These reported observations agree with animal
research data (Bell 1971). Some 16weeks after the Chernobyl
accident, fewer than 30 related deaths had been reported by
USSR officials.
Soviet officials did not disclose any effects on agriculture
from the accident until late August 1986 in the IAEA con-
ference in Vienna. Since the chimney effect would be ex-
pected to take the radioactivity high into the atmosphere, the
local effect on agriculture was probably very small. However,
one report estimates that 50% of the released radioactivity
was deposited within 30 km of Chernobyl. The accident oc-
curred on the west edge of Ukraine agricultural production
area. The air currents following the accidents carried most
of the radioactive fallout northwest and west of the food
producing areas of USSR and then on to adjacent countries.
From the German data (Hohenemser et al. 1986), we would
expect hot spot effects in the USSR where some of these
radioactive particles are retained on plants and animals. These
would probably not result in deaths of animals or entire
plants, but would probably result in noticeable local effects
like those reported from fallout on livestock at NTS (Nevada
Test Site) and Alamogordo, N.M. (Bell 1985). Effects would
vary, depending on the particle size, amount of radioactivity,
and time of particle retention. In animals, these effects might
vary from no noticeable effect to graying of hair to sores and
scar tissue in the injured area. Since all the human deaths
and fatalities were among the workers and firefighters in the
reactor building, radiation levels in the agricultural areas
would be expected to be much less due to dispersal and dilu-
tion of the released radioactivity.
Abagyan et al. (1986) reported that no effects on plants
and animals were observed beyond the 30-km zone around
the facility. Radioactive contamination varied within the
30-km zone, but there was some effect on radiosensitive
plants. Although results from most soil samples were not yet
available, one soil sample taken on May 6, 1986, 1.5 km from
the power plant, contained 1.2 X 107 Bq/g. They also stated
that soil uptake by plants was of no significance in crops har-
vested before August 1986.
Iodine-131 concentration in milk varied greatly as shown
in Figure 3. Highest levels of about 80 I-lCi/lwere observed
in Byelorussia, which is more sparsely populated than the
Ukraine. The range was from about 0.01 to 80 I-lCi/l for
iodine-131 in this area (Abagyan et al. 1986). The USSR max-
imum permitted level of 0.1 I-lCiof iodine-131/l was exceeded
in all of the 11 areas reported in Table 2. These data in Ta-
ble 2 demonstrate that milk was the only food product in
which radioactivity exceeded the permitted regulatory level
in all 11 areas. Iodine-131 was the major radioactive con-
taminant in milk.
Cesium isotopes were the principle radioactive con-
taminants in meat. Meat exceeded permitted levels in four
areas; berries and greens in three areas; vegetables in two
areas; and fish in only one area. Meat samples contained 0.1
to 0.02 I-lCi/kgof radioactive cesium. These data demonstrate
the importance of monitoring milk even though the range
of radioiodine concentrations varied widely (Figure 3). Data
were also presented in Vienna showing that on the first day
of the accident thyroid iodine-131 was monitored in 171 per-
sons. Most of the people had less than 20 I-lCi/thyroid, but
one individual had over 200 I-lCi.Presumbably the iodine-131
came from inhalation and skin absorption.
Data on the amount of each radioactive isotope released
are presented in Table 3. Little radioactivity was reported
in soils and forages. Levels of 11 radioisotopes in clover near
Chernobyl (Table 4) one month after the accident were not
high, and radioisotopes of cesium were of lower concentra-
tion than the other radioisotopes measured.
The effects of Chernobyl accident on personnel responsi-
ble for the agricultural food chain outside of USSR were quick
and very dramatic. Poland distributed iodine tablets which
were taken to block iodine-13l thyroid uptake from contami-
nated food. Large quantities of lettuce and fresh vegetables
were destroyed in Germany, even though most of the con-
tamination levels were low (Personal communication, Diehl
1986, and Pfau 1986). Canada refused to accept fresh vegeta-
bles from Italy due to detectable fallout. The British govern-
ment condemned lambs due to the levels of radioactive
cesium. On May 7, 1986, U.S. task force personnel refined
and updated Protective Action Guides (PAGs) levels that had
been established in 1982 (Nature 1986). In the U.S., prices
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FIGURE 2
ACTIVITY AND TEMPERATURE OF THE FUEL
AFTER THE ACCIDENT
(Abagyan 1986)
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Table 2
Agricultural Products in which
the Permitted Radioactive Contamination
was Found to be Exceeded
(Abagyan et al. 1986)
Food Products which do not
comply with regulations
Republic Region Milk &
Meat Dairy Greens Vege- Berries Fish
Produce tables
Minskaya 10 5 - - - -
Gomelskaya 40 30 15 10 5 90
Byelorussia Brestakaya 10 50 5 3 5 -
Mogilewskaya 20 10 - - - -
Grodhenskaya - 5 - - - -
Tulskaya - 15 - - - -
Bryanskaya - 30 - - - -
RSFSR Kalujskaya - 20 - - - -
Kurskaya - 30 - - - -
Oriovskaya - 10 - - - -
The Ukraine Kievskaya - 10 20 - 20 -
for wheat and bakery products abruptly increased by 20%,
but were back to the pre-Chernobyllevels by four weeks after
the accident.
Levels of iodine-13l in milk were reported for samples col-
lected by British Embassy personnel in several Eastern Block
countries. They are summarized in Table 5, adapted from
Webb et al. (1986) and other authors. These data show the
large variation in iodine-131 in these locations. Radioactive
contamination of milk was also monitored in several other
countries. In the vicinity of Munich, Germany, milk levels
of radioactivity were highest May 3, following the highest
forage levels on May 2. At this time, iodine-131 levels ex-
ceeded cesium-137 levels by a factor of 5. By the end of May,
iodine-131 decayed to the point that cesium-137 exceeded
iodine-131 by a factor of almost 5. Only very small quanti-
ties of strontium-90 were measured in the ground, amount-
ing to about 10% of the level measured during weapons
testing (1954-1966), but there was four times as much
cesium-137 found after Chernobyl than in weapons test fall-
out (GSF - Bericht 1986). These data confirm that primarily
volatile elements were released from Chernobyl. Other data
in this report show the distribution of radioactive fission
products deposited and incorporated into the food chain.
Short-lived molybdenum-99 is absorbed and excreted quickly
by humans and swine. Tellerium-132 is also short-lived and
most of it is not absorbed into the body. Cesium and stron-
tium are long-lived, and almost 100 times more cesium than
strontium was deposited. The radioisotopes of Ru were in-
termediate in abundance and in half life (40 d and 1y). For-
tunately, Ru is very poorly absorbed by animals, with
absorption amounting to less than 1% of intake (Thompson
et al. 1958). For long term planning purposes, it is expected
that cesium-137 will be the only fission product that needs
consideration outside of USSR.
Table 3
Estimated Releases of Radionuclides
from the Accident at
Chernobyl Nuclear Station (Ch NPS) *
Released Activity, MCI Release
Percentage by
06.05.86
may be up to 100
Nuclide
Xe-123
Kr-85m
Kr-85
1-131
Te-132
Cs-134
Cs-137
Mo-99
Zr-95
Ru-103
RU-106
Ba-140
Ce-141
Ce-144
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Cm-242
Sr-89
Sr-90
Np-239
26.04.86
5
0.15
4.5
4
0.15
0.3
0.45
0.45
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.45
0.1E-3
0.1E-3
0.2E-3
0.02
0.3E-6
0.3E-2
0.25
0.015
2.7
06.05.86* *
45
0.9
7.3
1.3
0.5
1
3
3.8
3.2
1.6
4.3
2.8
2.4
0.8E-3
0.7E-3
1E-3
0.14
2E-6
2.1E-2
2.2
0.22
1.2
*Estimated error ± 50%
* *Total release by May 6, 1986,
15
20
15
10
13
2.3
3.2
2.9
2.9
5.6
2.3
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.2
(Abagyan et al. 1986)
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Table 4
Radionuclide Content in Clover
at Chernobyl Near Ch NPS On 26 May 1986.
Nuclide Content
IlCi/kg
2.0
1.4
1.3
1.2
0.79
0.67
0.32
0.25
1.5
2.0
0.53
Ce-144
Ce-141
1-131
Ru-103
Ru-106
Ba-140
Cs-134
Cs-137
Zr-95
Nb-95
La-140
(Abagyan et ai., 1986)
Abagyan et al. (1986) data reported in Vienna demon-
strated the high levels of food contamination near Chernobyl
nuclear power plant (Table 5). Variation of radioactivity levels
in USSR and other countries was very great. Moscow showed
15-18 Bq/l of iodine-131 in milk compared with 370 -
3,000,000 Bq/l in Byleorussia. Some information from the
August 1986 IAEA meeting indicated a concern that plant
uptake of cesium in the low humus soils found in part of the
fallout area may be higher than in other soils. Speculation
is great due to release of little hard data. Normal agricultural
practices in cultivated farm land will increase the chance of
binding most of the cesium to soil particles, especially in clay
soils. Less binding of cesium is encountered in sandy soils.
Data by Handl and Pfau (1986) and Ward and Johnson (1986)
show lower uptake of fallout cesium deposited on plants com-
pared with CsClz used in most research studies.
Table 5
Levels of Radioactive Fallout from Chernobyl Nuclear Accident
Milk
Bg/I
137C5
15-18a
50-150b
20-2000C
100-500d
16-26006
4201
15009
370-3,000,000h
370-740,000;
37-3,700i
1,1000
9,300k
5-5001
2009
3000
10,000k
2-2001
5-501
134CS
Mixed
Radioisotopes
Meat
Bg/Kg
Water
Bgli
Forage
Bg/Kg
15,0009
48,000k
370,000q
10-10,0001700'
21-48m 4,000' 20-20,0001
300-2,000' 700m
300-10,0005
10-10,0001
19-30n
4,000P
10-10,0001
7,4001
4,000b
a-I. Webb et al. (1986): a-Moscow, b-Yugoslavia, c-Poland, d-Czechoslovakia, e-Hungary, I-Rumania.
g. Handl and PIau (1986) Germany
h-k. Abagyan et al. (1986): h-Byleorussia, i-Central Ukraine, j-South Ukraine, k-Chernobyl
I. Clark (1986) U.K.
m. Thomas and Martin (1986) France
n. Jones et al. (1986) U.K.
o. GSF-Bericht (1986) W. Germany
p. Phelps (1986) U.K.
q-s. Goldman et al. (1987): q-USSR, r-West Germany, s-Sweden
17
Radioactive contamination of travelers in USSR was
demonstrated in both British and Japanese personnel. Brit-
ish students were recalled from USSR since radioactivity in
the Scandinavian countries indicated a release significantly
greater than from the British Wind scale accident. Travelers
from Moscow showed no radioactive iodine contamination
of the thyroid while the 99 people traveling near Minsk and
Kiev all had measure able levels of radioiodine in their
thyroids. Considerable variation was observed, but all these
measured less than 30% of British annual limit for thyroid
dose to the public. Most of the radioactivity was on the stu-
dent's clothing, but only 2% of the clothing exceeded the
"clearance" level. Since Minsk is about 300 km north of
Chernobyl and Kiev about 100 km south, absorption of radio-
iodine in those locations demonstrates the magnitude of the
accident (Holliday et al. 1986). Changes in the external radi-
ation exposure rate due to decay are shown in Figure 4. In
addition, the total estimated exposures and doses in the 30-km
area around Chernobyl are given in Table 6 showing that the
public exposure was well below the lethal levels for humans.
Nuclear Weapons Tests - 1945-1962
For a number of years, the United States and USSR tested
nuclear weapons on and above the surface of the earth.
Although a test ban treaty for ground testing was signed by
representatives from several countries, other countries have
tested weapons. Some of these were surface bursts (detonat-
ed at ground level) and others were air bursts. Other than
medical uses of ionizing radiation, most experience with high
levels of radiation has been with radioactive fallout resulting
from nuclear weapons tests during the 1950's and 1960's.
Alamogordo - 1945. The first atomic bomb was exploded
at Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16, 1945. This explo-
sion produced visible effects on 130 cattle out of a herd of
300 Herefords that accidently wandered on to the bombing
range. This tower shot incorporated soil, the tower and other
debris in the radioactive fallout, causing damage to the backs
of some of these cattle. Fallout retention was probably in-
creased by the moisture on the hair of the cattle from a
thunderstorm that occurred several hours before the deto-
nation. None of these cattle died from radiation injury, but
the ranchers noted sores on the backs and some hair and skin
losses 2 to 4 weeks after exposure. In December 1945, sixty
of the most severely affected cows were shipped to Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, for security and research purposes. In 1948,
through a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission, the
University of Tennessee established an Agricultural Research
Laboratory (UT-AEC-ARL) to study radiation effects on
these cattle and other animals and plants, including fission
product metabolism. These cattle showed effects on their
backs varying from graying of red hair, to hyperkeratosis,
epilation, and horn like growths. Fourteen years after ex-
posure, squameous cell carcinoma developed on the backs
of three of the most severely affected cows.
Productivity of the exposed cows was comparable to
productivity of 70 control cows brought from New Mexico
in 1948. One of the exposed cows produced normal calves
every year she was under observation from 1948 through 1961
and was pregnant at the time of her death on October 4, 1962
(Bell, 1985 and Figure 5).
NTS - 1953. On March 24, 1953, a fallout cloud from
Nevada Test Site (NTS) passed over the rangeland north of
NTS in Nevada and Utah. Some owners reported unusually
high death losses in ewes and lambs grazing in the area and
suspected radioactive fallout as the cause of death.
Estimated losses were 3,000 lambs and 2,000 ewes amount-
ing to 20-25(Yo of the lambs and 20% of the ewes. Estimated
total body dose was 2.6 rad, with higher levels coming from
Table 6
Estimated Doses of Public Exposure in Some Populated
Areas in the 30-km Zone Around Ch NPS
(Abagyan et al. 1986)
Distance Exposure Dose on Dose from Radioactive 1
Settlement from from child's fallout in 7 days R
ChNPS discharge thyroid
km cloud rem Estimate Actual
Chistowka 5.5 10 120 84 3.2
Levlev 9 7 250 17 10
Chernobyl 16 1.2 80 5.6 3.0
Rudkl 22 0.6 80 5.6 22
Crevichi 29 0.2 25 1.8 44
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Figure 4
Change of the Y-radiation dose rate in the open country on the Ch NPS radioactive release trace.
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FIGURE5: Hereford cow accidentally exposed to fallout on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Note Grey hair on back
and side. This cow produced 15 calves in 16 years at UT-AEC- ARL. Calf at side In insert.
ingested radioactivity on the forage. Tissue doses were esti-
mated to be highest for thyroid, followed by rumen wall
where insoluble fallout particles might accumulate. Ex-
perimental research suggests that these dose levels would not
be expected to have any measurable effect on the sheep health
or survival (Sasser et al. 1971).
During the time of the sheep deaths, this area suffered
one of the worst drougths on record, with rainfall at only 50%
of the normal level. Reduced available forage may have re-
sulted in animals consuming toxic plants. Final conclusions
were that the sheep deaths were not a result of exposure to
radioactive fallout (Sasser et al. 1982). No record was found
for any observed fallout effects on the forage. At worst one
might fmd local "burns" from the Beta activity in fallout
particles retained on the surface of plants.
From 1951 to 1959, 88 burros were exposed to 180 - 545
R in research at NTS and in Oak Ridge compared with 24
controls. The irradiated burros survived for about 12% fewer
years than did the controls. In March 1987, only one control
burro and one burro exposed to about 250R at NTS were
still alive (Figure 6 Lushbaugh et al. 1983).
Pacifu Tests - 1954. The United States did some of its
nuclear weapons testing on small, uninhabited islands in the
Pacific Ocean and some accidental exposures occurred. Some
accidental exposures to residents occurred on the Marshall
Islands on March 1, 1954, when the wind direction shifted
unexpectedly and carried "significant amounts of fallout"
to the islands of Rongelap, Alginare, and Utirik. The whole
body gamma radiation exposures ranged from 175Ron Ron-
gelap, to 69 R on Alginare, to 14 R on Utirik (Sutow et al.
1965).
None of the residents on Utirik developed radiation symp-
toms, but the residents of the other two islands showed signs
and later showed some latent effects of their exposure. Other
than cesium-137 in coconuts, records of agricultural effects
were not found.
Nuclear Accidents
Cheliabinsk Province USSR - Winter 1957-1958. Reports
indicate a tremendous accident occurred in the Soviet Union
involving the atmospheric release of fission wastes and result-
ing in contamination of a large area about 800 miles east of
Moscow, although USSR officials have not to date confirmed
these reports to the world. Trabalka et al. (1980) reported
that the accident involved huge quantities of nitrates explod-
ing in a nuclear waste storage and separation facility. An es-
timated 100 to 1000 km2 area was contaminated and
hundreds of deaths occurred. Volatilization of fission products
was probably at a minimum from the nitrate explosion(s).
Much of the cesium-137 was thought to have already been
removed before the explosion, so that the principal long-term
contaminant was strontium-90 (105 - 106 Ci). From 108 to
109Ci of total fission products were initially released. About
30 villages previously shown no longer appear on maps of
the area. Paths of streams and the size of some lakes in the
area have also been changed.
Data on radiation effects from this accident on agricultural
FIGURE6: Mexican burros in 1987. One control (52) and one
irradiated (38) are only survivors of experiment started In the
early 50's.
plants and animals have not been released by USSR officials.
Neither have data been released on the amounts of contami-
nation of the food chain. However, published experimental
data from USSR since the accident may have relevance to
the accident. Osanov et al. (1974) reported on a dosimeter
model for dairy cows using 1.75 Ci of soluble mixed fission
products per cow. This was probably related to levels ingested
by cattle from the waste accident and not related to early fall-
out from a surface nuclear explosion, which was modeled in
animal experiments using insoluble 90y labeled sand (Bell
et al. 1970).
US - Mexican Cobalt-60 Contamination - December 1983.
Improper disposal of 1003 Ci of cobalt-60 in a teletherapy
unit from a hospital in Texas resulted in near lethal levels
of severe radiation injury to a Mexican family and others. The
unit was sent to a Specialists Medical Center in Mexico where
it was stored for 6 years. It was then junked and the sealed
cobalt source was broken open, releasing many tiny (1 mm)
cobalt pellets. The unit was placed into a pickup truck, ex-
posing a Mexican child and his family. The child played with
pellets in the truck. Other pellets were strewn along a 100
mile area into Mexico as the salvaged unit was moved to a
metal processing plant. Some of the cobalt-60 was returned
to U.S. in steel reinforcing rods and metal tables made from
molten steel contaminated with some of the cobalt-60. No
evidence has been found for this contamination entering the
food chain or having any effect on agriculture, but it is an
example of what can happen when people do not follow
prescribed safety procedures for disposal of highly radioactive
materials (NRC 1986).
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Uranium Conversion Plant - January 4, 1986. At the Se-
quoyah Fuels Corporation in Gore, Oklahoma, the contents
of a full 14-ton UF6 tank were accidently released into the
atmosphere. The uranium hexafluoride quickly changed into
UOzFz and HF upon contact with the air. Two herds of cat-
tle, consisting of 99 steers and 87 heifers, were downwind
from, and adjacent to, the facility. These cattle averaged about
600 Ibs. and were feeding on improved pasture plus hay. On
January 6, the cattle were removed from pasture, penned,
and fed hay. Urine sampling of some of these cattle plus con-
trol animals from either 10 miles west or northwest of the
plant, was initiated and continued through May 1986.
Animals belonging to the public were also examined, and
urine samples from the cattle were analyzed for uranium and
fluoride. Uranium and fluoride toxicity is primarily a chem-
ical toxicity concern because uranium is not very radioactive.
Uranium levels in urine were about 1600 Ilg/1 for heifers
and 470 Ilg/1 for steers on January 6. By the middle of Febru-
ary, levels had declined to 6 to 9 Ilg/l. Urine samples from
public owned animals averaged about 6 Ilg/1 while the con-
trols on improved pasture had urine samples averaging 16
Ilg/l. Phosphate fertilizer probably contributed the extra
uranium found in the control animals on improved pasture.
The UOzFz is probably one of the most available forms of
uranium even though usually less than 1% of ingested ura-
nium is absorbed by animals.
Fluoride was also abundant in the soil and in livestock
feeds. Levels were about 6 times as much as controls, and
amounts in urine were about 6 mg/l for exposed and 1 mg/l
for controls. Ingested fluoride is much more readily absorbed
than ingested uranium. Levels are in mg for fluoride and Ilg
for uranium indicating danger from fluoride toxicity was
greater than for uranium.
Retention of both uranium and fluoride was considered
to be insignificant and of no consequence in these livestock
(Still, 1986 personal communication).
Possible Radioactive Contamination
Sources
It is very important, in discussing radiation, to remember
that radioactivity is not a new phenomenon. Naturally-
occuring radioactivity can be found in the earth's crust, build-
ing materials, food, drinking water, space, people, and
animals (Lenihan et aI., 1967). For thousands of years, all
life on earth has been exposed to radiation from cosmic rays
and radioactive elements. Man, too, has developed in an en-
vironment of different levels of natural radiation found
throughout the world.
In Southwest France, the natural dose from two natural
uranium isotopes exceeds 100 rad (Leonard et al. 1979). This
area in southern France and an adjacient area in northern Italy
are known for health spas that advertise the curative powers
of mud and waters that are high in alpha-emitting radioactive
material.
Some areas ofthe United States are also naturally high in
radiation. For example, the background dose is estimated at
130 - 230 millirem per person per year in Denver, CO, com-
pared to 80 - 105 millirem for the whole country. In addi-
tion to this background radiation, other sources contribute
to total yearly dosage. Diagnostic and therapeutic medical
treatments add an average of another 70 millirems to the to-
tal per person per year (EPA 1977; Bondansky 1980).
If the number of nuclear power plants in this country were
greatly expanded, the additional average dose above back-
ground and all other sources would only be about one mil-
lirem per person per year (Bodansky 1980), about 1% of the
average natural background. At present, the amounts of radi-
ation received from nuclear power plants under normal con-
ditions is less than that received from the radionuclides
emitted from coal-fired power plants. In fact, a preliminary
study by the Environmental Protection Agency rated coal up
to 80 times riskier than nuclear power reactors in terms of
the radionuclides given off during normal operation (Agres
1980). The study suggested that there are "greater risks to
the public of developing cancer from radionuclides emitted
by coal-fired power plants than by normally operating nuclear
plants" (Agres 1980).
Coal naturally contains very small amounts of U-238,
U-23S, Th-232 and their radioactive daughters (McBride et
al. 1978), along with sulfur, iron, and moisture (Agres 1980).
As coal is burned, most of the mineral content is turned to
ash and slag. These waste forms contain most of the radio-
nuclides, but small amounts escape into the atmosphere.
These amounts depend upon the "particulate control system,
furnace design, mineral content of the coal, and the existing
emission control standards" (Agres 1980). As more new
scrubbing systems are put into use, the amounts of escaping
particulate matter are expected to decrease. However, the
present figures for fatalities from coal are higher than those
for nuclear power (Bodansky 1980). This comparison is not
intended to incriminate coal for its very small amount of
radioactivity, but merely to demonstrate that nuclear power
plants are not the only sources of radioactivity.
Coal from different parts of the country contains various
levels of radionuclides. Coal types from all parts of the Uoited
States average one part per million for uranium and two ppm
for thorium (McBride et al. 1978). Some coals were 10 to 40
times higher in concentration than the averages; anthracite
from Pennsylvania was the highest in thorium, and lignite
from the Gulf States - Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi -
was the highest in uranium (McBride et al. 1978). All ura-
nium and thorium, regardless of source, are radioactive. Both
of these elements occur in several isotope forms and their
radiation emissions vary in intensity, form and energy.
In view of these facts, the role of nuclear energy industry
must be considered in relation to other risks incurred in every-
day life. Nuclear power itself has not only been shown to be
useful, it can also pose hazards. The question of radiation
is not just one of concern with nuclear power plants; it deals
also with natural background, coal fired power plants, medi-
cal X-rays, radiation treatments, jet flights, cardiac pace-
makers, watches, smoke detectors, artificial teeth, and nuclear
explosions (Haaland 1979).
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Experimental procedures have shown varying effects of
radiation on animals. The estimate given for the median lethal
dose for man is "300-500 rads for short-term total-body radia-
tion" (Hamilton 1963). A similar lethal dose (LD 50) applies
to animals as well (Bell 1971). Animal data is much more ex-
tensive, and some of it was obtained from animals at Nevada
Test Site.
Low Level Radiation Erects
The natural radiation ievels in southwest France in excess
of 100 rads per year were studied. Researchers found that
an annual dose of 70 rads of gamma rays per year to rabbits
caused small increases in chromosome abberrations in the
blood lymphocytes, while they observed "no effect on the
spermatozoa of male mice similarly exposed, nor on their off-
spring" (Leonard et al. 1979). From these and similar studies,
it appears that chromosome abberrations are not indicative
of measurable damage to germ plasm, which would result
in effects on offspring.
Extensive studies were conducted at the Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory with 44 generations of male mice. These
studies "failed to reveal any genetic effects from large gona-
dal radiation doses. " This line of mice received a total dose
of 8,800 rads over the 44-generation period with "no demon-
strable damage" reported. As compared with the controls,
the irradiated mice showed no substantial differences in
reproductive life and overall life span, among other factors.
Conclusions drawn from this study indicate that mutations
in sperm may have in fact been induced, but the deviations
were probably fatal to the fertilized eggs (Bell and Bell 1981).
Erickson et al. (1976) studied long-term ionizing radiation
effects on 280 cows and found that from 6 to 300 R from
cobalt-60 had no measurable effect on reproductive perfor-
mance and no effect on germ cells and follicle counts.
After a five-year study, Shetland ponies irradiated with
a cumulative exposure of 650 R of whole-body gamma radia-
tion were found, in general, "able to perform work under
the conditions of the experiment as efficiently as the non-
irradiated ponies" (Brown 1975). Numerous other studies
have been conducted dealing with effects of high and low lev-
els of radiation. Since "risk may be looked upon as the proba-
bility of the occurrence of some unfavorable event" (Wodicka
1980), the risk of operation of a nuclear reactor power plant
must be considered in relation to other risks encountered in
everyday life.
Nuclear Reactor Accidents
Four general classifications of nuclear power reactor acci-
dents are defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
notification of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and
general (Table 7). Two types of possible accidents of con-
cern from the public standpoint are loss of coolant accidents
(LOCA) and fuel meltdown.
"It now seems probable that the worst possible accident
from the point of view of the exposure of the public to ioniz-
ing radiation is not a runaway nuclear reaction, but a loss
of coolant accident," suggested researcher Richard Wilson
in 1973. He explained that the accident could happen if the
cooling system in the reactor vessel or steam piping failed
in most commercial power reactors. Even though the nuclear
reaction would stop as soon as the moderator (the coolant)
disappeared, heat would continue to be produced, leaving
the core uncooled, unprotected and with the possibility of
meltdown (Wilson 1973).
The question of nuclear explosions in power reactors
should be of little concern. This was emphasized in 1969 by
Dr. Karl Z. Morgan, then director of Health Physics Divi-
sion of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, who said, "At this
point, I would like to make it very clear that nuclear explo-
sions (weapons type) are impossible in nuclear power re-
actors" (Morgan 1969). Nuclear reactors are designed to
prevent explosions like an atomic bomb (Kemeny 1979). The
fuel in commercial reactors is not highly enriched (contains
less fissionable uranium) and is configured for a sustained
reaction, not an explosive burst.
The Kemeny report concluded that at TMI the hydrogen
bubble inside the pressure vessel could not have exploded
or ruptured the pressure vessel (Burnett 1980).
Possible Food Chain Contamination
Livestock play an important link in the human food chain
by supplying nutrients, using sources of nutrients that hu-
mans cannot directly use, and ftltering out many undesirable
materials from the diet. Cattle and sheep depend mostly on
hay and pasture in their diets, while swine and poultry de-
pend mostly on grain.
Iodine
Iodine, essential to the thyroid gland function, is usually
present in the thyroid equal to the amount in the diet (Miller
et al. 1975). Feeding excess iodine, however, increases iodine
excretion with some increase in thyroid iodine. Iodine losses
from normal intake include 30% feces, 40% urine, and 8%
in milk. (Dairy cows secrete less iodine in milk than most
other species.)
Cows' milk has different concentrations of iodine at differ-
ent stages of lactation, with a higher concentration in the later
stages. However, a mixed herd of cows will be at different
stages, and this difference will not play an important part in
the level of radioiodine in the milk. Even after secretion into
the mammary gland, much of the iodine is available for
resorption (Miller et al. 1975).
Radioisotopes of iodine, predominately iodine-131, would
be the main concern from a nuclear reactor. Contaminated
fresh milk is the main contributor of iodine-131 to the hu-
man diet. Inhalation of iodine-131 and consumption of un-
washed, contaminated vegetables and fruits would not be
expected to be a significant problem. In the case of commer-
cially produced fruits and vegetables, the transit time from
harvest to consumer is long enough for large amounts of the
isotope to decay. Milk, on the other hand, is of major con-
cern, if the dairy cows are consuming contaminated pasture,
because of its short market time.
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Table 7
Classification of Nuclear Power Reactor
Accidents (Grimes and Ryan 1980)
Class
Class
Description
Release
Potential
Expected
Frequency
Class 1:
Notification
of an unusual
event
Unusual events are in
process or have occurred
which indicate a poten-
tial degradation of the
level of safety of the
plant.
No releases of
radioactive material
requiring offsite response
or monitoring are ex-
pected unless further
degradation of safety
systems occurs.
Once or twice
per year per unit.
Class 2:
Alert Events are in process or
have occurred which
involve an actual or po-
tential substantial de-
gradation of the level of
safety of the plant.
Limited releases of up to
10 Ci of 1-131 equivalent
or up to 104 Ci of Xe-133
equivalent.
Once in 10 to 100 years
per units.
Class 3:
Site
emergency
Events are in process or
have occurred which
involve actual or likely
major failures of plant
functions needed for pro-
tection of the public.
Releases of up to 100 Ci
of 1-131 equivalent or up
to 106 Ci of Xe-133
equivalent.
Once in one hundred to
once in 5000 years per
unit.
Class 4:
General
emergency
Events are in process or
have occurred which in-
volve actual or imminent
substantial core degrada-
tion or melting with poten-
tial for loss of containment
integrity.
Releases of more than
1000 Ci of 1-131 equiva-
lent or more than 106 Ci
of Xe-133 equivalent.
Less than once in about
5000 years per unit. Life
threatening doses offsite
(within 10 miles) once in
about 100,000 years per
unit.
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The peak concentration of iodine-131 from a single dose
occurs about one day after the intake. If cows are allowed
to remain on contaminated pasture, the peak level will be
reached in three days (Comar 1965). Still, the amount that
is passed on in milk is less than the cow received. "Under
conditions of oral ingestion, about 8% of the daily intake of
iodine-131 is secreted into each day's milk" (Comar 1965).
The physical half-life of iodine-131 is eight days, but ex-
perimental work showed that on undisturbed pasture, the bi-
ological half-life may vary from three to six days (Sasser and
Hawley 1966). Reduction of the iodine-131 on the pasture
can occur from radioactive decay, rainfall, wind, mechani-
cal disturbance, or new growth.
Swedish researchers found that ofthe iodine-131 deposited
on pasture area, 60% volatilized before the cows were put
on the pasture 18 hours later. While the cows were grazing
over the next three days, an additional 6% of the iodine-131
dissappeared; thus, about 2% was eaten by the cows (Auralds-
son et al. 1971).
Almost all dairy cows are given supplemental feed even
when they are on pasture. Non-lactating cows are usually not
given supplemental feed on pasture. However, one must as-
sume that any grazing cow could receive contaminating doses
of radioiodine and pass it on in milk.
Radioiodine may get into the cow diet via ingestion of con-
taminiated pasture, contaminated feed, water, or other
means. The exposure from inhalation is considered minimal
to zero (Thompson 1967). Once cows are removed from con-
taminated pasture, the level of contamination in milk will
drop rapidly. Water from cisterns or ponds could supply les-
ser amounts of iodine in the diet.
Exposed cattle may be fed stable iodine to reduce the
iodine-131 content in milk. Daily feeding of 1.3 g reduced
the level in milk by one-third, while feeding 2.0 g reduced
it one-half in a Tennessee study (Miller et al. 1975). Non-
lactating cattle contribute insignificant amounts of iodine-131
to the food chain, due to the decay of radioactive iodine dur-
ing the delay time from grazing of cattle to meat consump-
tion and the small amount of iodine that accumulates in meat.
Radioiodine contamination of fresh vegetables and fruits
is less of a problem with commercially-produced food because
of the transit time from harvest to market. However, home
gardens could contain contaminated foodstuffs from radio-
activity deposited on the surface of leafy vegetables. These
vegetables, because of their proximity to the consumers,
might be eaten within 24-hours after they were contaminated
(Thompson 1967). This time period would not allow for suffi-
cient radioactive decay of iodine-131. Direct consumption of
iodine-131 in water might be a problem in water from
cisterns, but not in that from wells and treated municipal
water supplies.
Strontium
Radioisotopes of strontium are a small percentage of fis-
sion products. Strontium-90 is of concern in the food chain
to humans because it has a long half life of 28 years and be-
cause it reacts chemically like calcium. Over 99% of the stron-
tium retained by humans and animals is in the bones. Large
amounts of strontium-90 in bone can cause bone cancer. Of
the approximately 20% of dietary strontium absorbed, most
of this is excreted in urine and feces with some excreted in
milk from lactating animals. Young growing animals will ab-
sorb more strontium than adults, but will have a faster turn-
over rate of strontium due to bone growth and bone
remodeling. Much has been written on strontium in the food
chain to humans (Lenihan et al., 1967). Biological organisms
discriminate against strontium-90 in preference for calcium.
Strontium-90 can enter plants both by uptake through the
roots and by absorption after deposition on plant surfaces.
The absorption of the calcium and strontium-90 from soils
is influenced by clay content, humus content, pH, moisture
level, concentration of electrolytes, and the calcium already
in the soil (Comar 1965). Strontium will more likely be taken
up by plants growing in soils that have a low level of calcium
(Lenihan et al., 1967).
The amount of contamination that a cow passes along in
milk will be much less than the amount ingested, because
the animal "always puts into milk less ofthe strontium than
the calcium that is in the ration" (Comar 1965).
Strontium-89, with a much shorter half-life of 50 days, moves
through the food chain like strontium-90, but causes fewer
problems because it decays faster.
Cesium
Cesium-13 7 affects plants by direct contamination, and
some can be easily removed from plants by rainfall. Very lit-
tle of the cesium is taken up from the soil, probably because
of the "fixation in the lattice structure of clay minerals."
More would be available from sandy soils (Ward 1961). Some
fixation of foliar-deposited cesium has been observed in
animals fed forage containing fallout cesium compared with
radioactive cesium chloride (Ward and Johnson 1986).
Once in an animal's body, cesium-37 is metabolized like
potassium and moves through the gastrointestinal tract and
on to the muscle tissues. In lactating animals, the cesium
passes through to milk, also. As a result, most of the con-
tamination to the human food supply is from milk and meat
(Eisenbud 1963).
Plutonium, Krypton, and Xenon
Experiments showed that, following ingestion by a cow
of a soluble form of plutonium, less than .000001% of the
dose per liter was secreted into milk" (Comar 1965). Practi-
cally none of plutonium ingested was absorbed, and 99.99%
was excreted in the feces of livestock.
Krypton and xenon are inert gases that are poorly soluble
in water and tissues (Sagan 1974). Annual doses ofkrypton-85
are small and are estimated to continue to remain insignifi-
cant. In addition, the importance of cumulative doses in the
population is marginal (Eichholz 1976). When released into
the atmosphere, those gases mix completely with the air,
which already contains one ppm krypton and 0.1 ppm xe-
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non. Both of these inert gases are used in light bulbs;
xenon-133 is a radioactive gas used in cardiac, blood flow and
pulmonary function studies (Windholz 1976; United Nations
1977). Krypton has a biological half-life of 18 hours; xenon,
an average of 7 hours (Sagan 1974).
Recommended Actions to Protect the Food
Supply
In the event of a nuclear power reactor accident that
releases fission products into the atmosphere, there are ap-
propriate actions that can be taken to help protect the food
supply. Emotionalism has no place in the rational response
to contamination of our foods. Some recommendations may
not apply to everyone, as geographic differences and climatic
limitations often dictate actions. Measures to deal with a pos-
sible contamination are given, including the Protective Ac-
tion Guides set up by the federal government (Table 8).
Protective Action Guide levels in the U.S. were proposed in
1977, established in 1982 and then slightly revised on May
7, 1986 after the Chernobyl accident. (Schelien et al. 1977;
Federal Register 1982; Engel 1986). The USDA Radiological
Emergency Response Plan should be consulted for guidance.
This plan is being revised and probably will be condensed
into a clear and concise set of guidelines for procedures in
the near future.
Soil
Soil contamination would not be of immediate concern,
but proper management procedures could do a great deal to
reduce a problem, should contamination occur. The addi-
tion of lime to calcium-poor soils can reduce the uptake of
radioactive strontium by plants. Usual soil cultivation prac-
tices for row crops would reduce the amount of radioactivity
on the surface. Turning the soil by plowing would greatly
reduce the surface radioactivity and reduce the plant uptake
of radioactivity by diluting the concentrations around the
roots. However, it may not be advisable or practical to culti-
vate pasture areas, especially if erosion would be increased.
Vegetables
The greatest amount of contamination reaches vegetables
directly. Rainfall carries radioactive contamination into cavi-
ties of the fresh leafy vegetables where it collects. For com-
mercially produced vegetables that have a waiting period
between harvest and market, this would not be a problem
for short-lived contaminants. Skins or outer leaves of home-
grown vegetables should be removed and the remainder
washed throughly. Canning, freezing, or other storage of
vegetables would allow decay of short-lived radionuclides.
Heavily contaminated vegetables might be fed to livestock
or discarded.
Grain
For grains, Protective Action Guide action would proba-
bly not be needed, but milling and polishing will reduce the
amount of contamination. Time from harvest to consumer
would be an important factor here, and in many cases, may
be several months. Grains have much lower concentrations
of calcium and potassium than cereal stems and leaves, so
they would also be low in strontium and cesium. Grains are
high in starch and low in minerals. Minerals are mostly in
the seed coat so milling and polishing would reduce content
of fission products. Feeding the seed coat products to
livestock would further dilute the fission products in human
food.
Milk
Lactating dairy cows currently on pasture should be re-
moved and fed uncontaminated stored feed and water. Silages
or other feeds harvested and stored before an accident would
be acceptable. Milk should be tested by an appropriate
agency, and their advice should be followed if Protective Ac-
tion Guide levels are exceeded. Possible actions would include
diversion of milk for manufacturing purposes or withhold-
ing contaminating milk from market to allow for radioactive
decay. Milk could be frozen, concentrated, dehydrated, or
processed in other methods to allow this to occur. Radio-
nuclides can be removed from milk via ionexchange resin
columns; however, to date this process has not been com-
mercially explored on a large scale and is available in only
a few areas. The same principles would be involved to pro-
tect milk from fallout from nuclear weapons, except weapons
contain much higher concentrations of radioactivity and cover
much greater areas (Bell and Blake 1976).
Meat
Meat and meat products would be considered on a case-
by-case basis, according to the Protective Action Guides.
Strontium is concentrated in bone, so bone removal before
cooking meat is advisable. Most of the cesium can be removed
from meat by extracting water from 1" cubes of meat (Bell
1985).
Eggs
Eggs contribute only minor amounts of contamination to
the food chain and these would not present a problem. Fur-
thermore, chickens are housed in buildings that could pro-
vide shielding from most airborne contamination, and their
feed likely would have been processed and stored before an
accident.
General
If iodine-131 is the only radio nuclide that exceeds Protec-
tive Action Guides, then storage to allow the iodine to decay
would be a solution. Contaminated food products could also
be diverted and fed to livestock other than cows producing
milk.
Radiation Induced Cancers
Exposure to high levels of ionizing radiation increases the
incidence of cancers. Cancers caused by radiation cannot be
distinguished from cancers from other causes. In humans,
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Table 8
Prevention Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
Meat Forage
Bg/kg Bg/kg
1,850a
1,850b
1,500c
1,000d 48,000a
48,000b
2,800c
30,000a
30,000b
4,900a
4,900b
111,000s
111,000b
Milk
Bg/kg
137Cs
555a
555b
2,000d
9,000a
9,000b
3,600d
5,555a
5,555b
3,100c
333a
333b
1,200d
134Cs
90s,
89Sr
Total Intakea (Emergency Protective Action Guides)
1311 3,333
134cs 148,000
137Cs 260,000
90s, 7,400
895, 95,000
a. Federal Register (1982)
b. FDA (1986
c. Engel (1986)
d. Clark (1986)
most radiation-induced cancers occur in the adult population,
since the average latent period for solid tumors is 20 to 30
years. Radiation-induced leukemia seems to have a 2 to
lO-year latency. Even though high levels of ionizing radia-
tion can increase the incidence of cancer, radiation is used
in many types of cancer therapy, because many cancer cells
are more sensitive to radiation than the normal cells.
In the 80,000 survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) reports an in-
crease of about 5% in cancer rate compared with the 28,000
controls. Of the 23,499 deaths from all causes, 4,575 were
from cancer at the time of the 1984 report and only 251 were
probably from radiation (Mettler Ref p 35). In the 46,000
military personnel who were involved in the atomic bomb
tests in the Pacific and at Nevada Test Site (NTS), no evi-
dence was found for an increase in cancer deaths. The lower
incidences of cancer deaths than expected among these ser-
vice personnel may be due to the good physical condition of
the individuals involved (Marwich 1985). Much speculation
has been made on the thousands of cancer deaths to be ex-
pected from the Chernobyl accident. However, the estimates
from Vienna are that in Western USSR over the next 70 years,
there will be only a 0.05% increase in cancer deaths due to
Ground
Bg/m2
Water
Bg/I
4,800b
11,000d
111,000b
111,000b
50,000d
74,000a
74,000b
43,000d500,000d
18,500b
28,000d
300,000a
300,000b
the exposure to short-lived fission products (mostly iodine)
and an 0.4% increase due to the long-lived fission products
(mostly cesium-137) (Norman 1986).
Cancer increases can be effectively measured if exposures
are above 100 R, but extrapolation to effects from low levels
of exposure may provide erroneous data. There is little hu-
man data on low level effects, and most animal data indicate
that radiation cancer effects will be overestimated if the data
are extrapolated in very low doses. There are some indica-
tions that very low level exposures increase the chance of tis-
sue repair and recovery so low level effects may never be
measurable.
Cancer developed on the backs of three Hereford cows 15
years after an estimated dose of 57,000 rad to the surface of
the skin. This fallout dose came from downwind of the first
atomic bomb test near Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July
of 1945. Small areas of squameous cell carcinomas developed
after the average productive life expected for Hereford cows;
these cows were estimated to be at least 3 years of age at time
of exposure. No increase was observed in the incidence of
"cancer eye" in these cows compared with the control group
(Brown et al. 1966). Another example of cancer from beta
exposure was observed in a wether which developed severe
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diarrhea after being fed 20 mCi cerium-144 daily for 14days.
After 22 months, this animal developed carcinoma near the
dock where radioactivity accumulated in the wool (West and
Bell 1974). Most farm animals are not kept for longevity, so
the chance of observing cancer from whole body gamma ex-
posures are very small.
Risks From Exposure To Ionizing Radiation
Evidence suggests that ionizing radiation has always been
one of the constituents of the universe. Geological time has
been mapped using the concentration of several radioisotopes
and their decay products. Background radiation varies on
earth and the altitude above the earth. No significant effects
on the Chinese have been found from over 70,000 people liv-
ing in an area with background radiation 3 times the level
of a similar group of controls (Bell 1985).
Lethal and near lethal levels of ionizing radiation effects
on humans and on agriculture are well documented.
However, data on effects of small increases in background
radiation are elusive and somewhat contradictory. Data avail-
able on nonmammals show more improvement on reproduc-
tion and productivity than detrimental effects (Luckey 1982).
Stimuli have often been shown to cause positive responses
unless the organisms are overwhelmed by the stimuli.
No recorded deaths in the United States can be traced to
commercial nuclear power reactor accidents; however, ac-
cidental exposures in human medicine and improperly used
medical radiation devices have resulted in lethal human ex-
posures. No measurable effects on agricultural plants and
animals have been recorded from accidental exposure to radia-
tion from nuclear power or other peaceful uses of ionizing
radiation. No deaths from transportation of radioactive
materials have occurred in the U.S., even though public sur-
veys list this as a major concern (Abelson 1986). Radioactive
fallout from atomic bomb tests has shown measurable effects
on livestock.
If the nuclear power plant system in this country were
greatly expanded, the additional average dose above back-
ground and all other sources would only be about one mil-
lirem per person per year (Bodansky 1980). Natural
background radiation averages about 100 times this level. At
present, the amount of radiation received from nuclear power
plants under normal conditions is less than the amount of
radionuclides emitted from coal-fired power plants, as men-
tioned under possible sources of radioactive contamination.
In fact, a preliminary study by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency that rated coal up to 80 times riskier than nuclear
power reactors in terms of the radionuclides given off dur-
ing normal operation suggested that coal-fired power plants
present greater risks to the public of developing cancer from
radionuclides than a normally operating nuclear plant. (Agres
1980).
In view of these facts, the role of nuclear power must be
looked at in relation to other risks incurred in everyday life.
Nuclear power itself has not only been shown to be useful,
but it can also be harmful. The question of radiation is not
just one dealing with nuclear power plants; it deals also with
background, coal fired power plants, medical X-rays, radia-
tion treatments, jet flights, cardiac pacemakers, watches,
smoke detectors, artificial teeth, and nuclear explosions
(Haaland 1979).
If nuclear power production throughout the world ceased,
we would experience about a 50% increase in the cost of elec-
tricity and an energy shortage using the present technology
available. Nuclear power plants in the United States are ex-
tremely safe-safer and cleaner than other forms of energy
production. Many of the so called "unacceptable risks" of
nuclear power are based on unfounded hysteria and are not
based on factual information. In the United States, 16% of
electricity is produced from nuclear power compared with
19% in Great Britian, 31% in West Germany and 65% in
France (Dickson 1986). In France, electricity from nuclear
power costs 2/3 as much as that produced from coal. Con-
struction costs of nuclear power plants in France are 35 to
60% lower than in the United States. They have a stream-
lined licensing system compared with that of the United
States. According to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
report no major differences exist in safety of U.S. and French
nuclear power plants.
Okrent (1987) reviewed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission Policy Statement goals which state that (1) "indivi-
dual members of the public should be provided a level of
protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant
operation such that they bear no significant additional risk
to life and health" and (2) "societal risks to life and health
from nuclear power should be comparable or less than the
risks of generating electricity by viable competing techno-
logies. " The first goal appears to be unrealistic and incom-
patible with the second goal.
Most members of the public make rational risk decisions.
Whatever we do involves some risk, so we should continue
to reduce risks or at least reduce them to levels comparable
to other risks. We should not single out anyone industry and
decide that any risk at all in that industry is intolerable.
Results of zero risk levels for radiation exposures, nuclear
reactors, or the environment can only mean stagnation of a
production industry, increase in the pollution monitoring in-
dustry, and an increase in costs with the eventual decrease
in the quality of life.
Summary
Nuclear radiation, radioisotopes, and nuclear power are
widely used throughout the world for the benefit of hu-
mankind.
Nuclear power reactors are producing electricity in the
United States and throughout the world. From the data avail-
able, the nuclear power reactor industry appears to be as safe,
if not safer, than most other industries for the production
of electricity. Nuclear power reactors cannot explode like an
atomic bomb. Danger to humans from the TMI and Cher-
nobyl accidents appears to have been much less than antic-
ipated.
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Protective Action Guides to protect people and the food
supply have been established for action in the event of major
nuclear accidents. The possibility of major contamination of
the agricultural community downwind from a nuclear power
accident appears to be unlikely. If some release occurred,
radioactive isotopes of iodine in the food chain to humans
would be the primary concern. These could enter by way of
milk from grazing cows and from fresh leafy vegetables
produced downwind from the accident. Radioactive cesium
could also be volatilized, but not to the extent of iodine.
Radioactive strontium is less apt to be released. The noble
gases krypton and xenon and the heavy metals such as ura-
nium and plutonium are not absorbed and retained by hu-
mans and animals, so, if released, they are of no real threat
to agricultural food chains to humans.
Countermeasures for the agricultural community would
consist of removing all milk-producing animals from pasture
and giving stored feed where required by the Protective Ac-
tion Guide. Milk above safe levels would be stored until safe,
diverted to other uses, or simply dispersed with waste water.
Fresh leafy vegetables could be washed and outer leaves re-
moved, or the vegetables could be destroyed if levels were
unsafe. Appropriate guidelines based on accurate informa-
tion would be helpful in the aftermath of any large radiation
accident.
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Glossary of Terms
Background-the radiation in man's natural environment, in-
cluding cosmic rays and radiation from the naturally radi-
oactive elements.
Becquerel (Bq)-the amount of radioactivity equal to 27 pCi.
Becquerels are usually quoted per unit volume in liters (1)
or weight in grams (g) or kilograms (kg).
Core- The active portion of a nuclear reactor, containing the
fissionable material.
Critical-capable of sustaining a chain reaction at a constant
level.
Critical reactor-a nuclear reactor in which the ratio of
moderator to fuel is either sub critical or just critical.
Curie (Ci)-the unit used in measuring radioactivity, equal
to the quantity of any radioactive material in which the num-
ber of disintegrations per second is 3.7 x 1010• One Ci equals
37,000,000,000 Bq.
Dosimeter-an instrument that measures the total dose of
nuclear radiation received in a given period.
Fission-the splitting of an atomic nucleus into two parts of
approximately equal size, accompanied by the conversion of
part of the mass into energy.
Fission product-any radioactive or stable nuclide resulting
from fission, including both primary fission fragments and
their radioactive decay products.
Half-life-the time it takes for disintegration (decay) of half
the atoms in a given amount of radioactive material.
Lethal dose 50 (LD-50)-the dose of a substance that is fatal
to 50% of a specific group.
Metric abbreviations:
1,000 picocuries (pCi) = 1 nCi - 10-9
1,000 nanocuries (nCi) = 1 uCi - 10-6
1,000 microcuries (uCi) = 1 mCi - 103
1,000 millicuries (mCi) = 1 Ci
1,000 curies (Ci) = 1 kCi - 103
1,000 kilocuries (kCi) = 1 MCi - 106
1,000 megacuries (MCi) = 1 GCi - 109
Nuclear reactor-a device containing fissionable material in
sufficient quantity and so arranged as to be capable of main-
taining a controlled, self-sustaining nuclear fission chain
reaction.
Rad-a unit of absorbed dose, equal to energy absorption of
100 ergs per gram (0.01 joule per kilogram). One rad equals
slightly more than one roentgen.
Radioactive-giving off, or capable of giving off, radiant ener-
gy in the form of particles or rays, as alpha, beta and gamma
rays, by the spontaneous disintegration of atomic nuclei.
Radioactive decay-the spontaneous transformation of a
nuclide into one or more different nuclides, accompanied by
either the emission of particles from the nucleus, nuclear cap-
ture or ejection of orbital electrons, of fission.
Radioisotope-a naturally occurring or artificially created
radioactive isotope of a chemical element.
Rem-a unit of ionizing radiation, equal to the amount that
produces the same damage to humans as one roentgen of high-
voltage X-rays; derived from roentgen equivalent man (rem).
Roentgen-a quantity used in measuring ionizing radiation,
from X-rays or gamma rays, equal to the quantity of radia-
tion that will produce, in 0.001293 grams (1 cc) of dry air
at 0° and 760 mm mercury pressure, ions carrying one elec-
trostatic unit of electricity of either sign; abbreviated as R.
One R equals about 0.87 rads in air or 0.96 rads exposure
in tissue.
Supercritical reactor-a nuclear reactor in which the effec-
tive multiplication constant is greater than one and conse-
quently a reactor that is increasing its power level; if
uncontrolled, a supercritical reactor will undergo a sudden
and dangerous rise in power level.
Zero-power reactor-an experimental nuclear reactor oper-
ated at low neutron flux and at a power level so low that no
forced cooling is required; fission product activity in the fuel
is then sufficiently low to permit handling of the fuel after use.
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